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1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The corporate form (referred to as the company or the corporation) is a core
concept in corporate law that is recognized worldwide. In its basic appearance
the corporate form is a legal person (as opposed to e.g. partnerships) with a
capital that is divided into transferable shares, that is led by a corporate board,
and inwhich neither the shareholders nor the corporate directors are personal-
ly liable for the obligations of the company. This contribution considers the
nature of the company as a statutory core legal concept in the Netherlands.
After some observations of a more general nature, the discussion of the com-
pany as a core legal concept will take place against the backdrop of another
statutory core legal concept that is firmly rooted in corporate law in the
Netherlands: the duty of corporate directors in the performance of their duties
to be guided by the best interests of the company and the undertaking that
is connectedwith it. Paragraph 2 is introductory and describes some elements
of corporate law in the Netherlands. Paragraph 3 investigates the origins of
the company in the Netherlands. Then attention shifts to the core legal concept
that corporate directors must be guided by the best interests of the company
and its undertaking. Paragraphs 4 and 5 discuss landmark cases of the Dutch
SupremeCourt on corporate law: historic case law (the Doetinchemse IJzergie-
terij and Forum-Bank cases in paragraph 4) and a more recent case (the ASMI-
case in paragraph 5) that show how the core legal concept of acting in the
best interests of the company and its undertaking has in Netherlands case law
gradually shaped thinking about the company as such. Whereas the origins
of the company are in contract law (as is also reflected in the historic case law),
both the historic and the more recent case law show that the company has
developed over time into an abstract organizational form in which (as would
be expected in such an abstract organization) the authority of the board of
directors is pre-eminent. The idea of the corporate form as an abstract organiza-
tional form in which the position of the corporate board is paramount is not
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exceptional, as is borne out by the discussion of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of Delaware (United States of America) in the Selectica case
in paragraph 6. This judgment as well as the case law discussed from the
Netherlands show that companies have similar characteristics, however
different the jurisdictions are in which they appear. However, a recent judg-
ment by the Dutch Supreme Court in 2014 in the Cancun case (discussed in
paragraph 7) may prompt a re-evaluation of the thinking on the nature of the
company. The Cancun case could be a watershed in the sense that the Dutch
Supreme Court seems to indicate that – when interpreting the core legal
concept that directors in performing their duties must be guided by the best
interests of the company and the undertaking that is connected with it – the
organizational characteristics of an individual companymay play an important
role in determining the duties of the corporate directors. Thus interpreted,
a company should no longer be regarded just as an abstract organizational
form but also as an organization whose specific organizational characteristics
determine how corporate directors should perform their duties. Interestingly,
this recent development in the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court occurred
in a situation where the company that was the object of the legal proceedings
was a joint venture company of a highly contractual nature.
2 A PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION ON THE CORPORATE FORM (IN THENETHER-
LANDS)
In the Netherlands there are two types of companies, the public limited com-
pany (or company limited by shares, in Dutch the naamloze vennootschap,
abbreviated NV) and the private limited company (or private company with
limited liability, in Dutch the besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid,
usually referred to as the besloten vennootschap for short, abbreviated BV).
Legislation on the public limited company dates back as far as 1838, in what
was then the Commercial Code, and legislation on the private limited company
dates back to 1971, also inwhatwas then the Commercial Code. Today, public
limited companies and private limited companies are regulated in the Dutch
Civil Code.
Articles 2:64 and 175 DCC are the opening articles of Title 4 and Title 5 of
the Second Book of the DCC respectively. These articles hold the definitions
of the two types of companies. Under Article 2:64, par. 1 DCC a public limited
company ‘is a legal personwith an authorized capital divided into transferable
shares’, and under Article 175, par. 1 DCC a private limited company ‘is a legal
person with an authorized capital divided into one or more transferable
shares’, to which in both provisions is added: ‘The shareholders shall not be
personally liable for acts performed in the name of the company and shall
not be liable to contribute to losses of the company in excess of the amount
whichmust be paid up on their shares’. In accordancewith Articles 2:64, par. 2
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and 175, par. 2 DCC both a public limited company and a private limited com-
pany may be incorporated by either one (natural or legal) person or several
(natural or legal) persons, and shall be established by a notarial deed of
incorporation. In accordance with Articles 2:66, par. 2 and 177, par. 2 DCC the
name of a public limited company and a private limited company shall begin
or end with the words Naamloze Vennootschap (or the abbreviated form NV)
or Besloten Vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid (or the abbreviated form
BV) respectively. In comparison with the public limited company the private
limited company is intended to be a ‘light’ company in the sense that the
private limited company is more ‘flexible’ than the public limited company
and is more ‘simplified’ as opposed to the public limited company.
There are several notable differences between public limited companies
and private limited companies under Netherlands company law. To note but
a few, first, both the issued share capital and the paid up part of the issued
share capital of a public limited company shall be at least 45,000 euros (and
shall be expressed in euros), whereas the issued share capital of a private
limited company shall be at least one euro cent only and the paid up part of
the issued share capital of a private limited company may be as little as zero
(and need not be expressed in euros). Second, as a general rule the directors
of a public limited company shall be appointed by the company’s general
meeting (in principle by amajority decision), whereas the directors of a private
limited company may be appointed by either the company’s general meeting
(in principle by a majority decision) or by a meeting of holders of shares of
a specific class or type (in principle by a majority decision) as opposed to the
company’s general meeting as a whole. Third, all shareholders of a public
limited company shall have both voting rights and the right to distribution
of profits, whereas a private limited companymay have shareholders that have
shares to which either no voting rights or the right to distribution of profits
are attached (with the express provision that shares cannot be devoid of voting
rights and the right to distribution of profits cumulatively). Fourth, the articles
of a public limited companymay provide that the company’s board of directors
must conduct itself in accordance with the directions of a corporate body (e.g.
the general meeting) in respect of the general policy to be pursued in areas
further specified in the articles, whereas the articles of a private limited com-
panymay simply provide that the company’s board of directors must conduct
itself in accordance with the directions of another corporate body (e.g. the
general meeting), with no limitation to only the general policy to be pursued
and without the need of specifying the relevant areas in the articles.
There are also some notable similarities between public limited companies
and private limited companies under Netherlands company law. First, on the
level of its board of directors both a public limited company and a private
limited company may be organized as a one-tier board or a two-tier board.
In a one-tier board (also: unitary board) the board of directors consists of both
executive directors and non-executive directors, the non-executive directors
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performing the internal supervisory function. In a two-tier board (also: dual
board) next to themanagement board (comprised ofmanaging directors) there
is a supervisory board (comprised of supervisory directors), the supervisory
directors performing the internal supervisory function. However, as a general
rule Netherlands company law does not require that there is an internal
supervisory function. This means that a public limited company and a private
limited companymay just have a board of directors comprised of only execut-
ive directors, or may just have a management board without having a super-
visory board. Second, under Articles 2:129 par. 5 and 239 par. 5, and 140, par.
2 and 250, par. 2 DCC all corporate directors, whether executive directors and
non-executive directors (if the latter have been appointed) in a one-tier board,
or managing directors and supervisory directors (if the latter have been
appointed) in a two-tier board, shall, in the performance of their duties, ‘be
guided by the best interests of the legal person and the undertaking connected
with it’. It is precisely this provision that has been regarded as underlining
that public limited companies and private limited companies are an abstract
organizational form. Awidely held view on this provision holds that corporate
directors should take into account and balance the interests of all stakeholders
in the company and not just the interest of the company’s shareholders.1
3 AN OBSERVATION ON THE ORIGINS OF THE CORPORATE FORM (IN THE
NETHERLANDS)
The fading years of the sixteenth century witnessed a remarkable economic
development in the Netherlands. These years saw the establishment of a
number of companies devoted to far-reaching overseas trade. Next to sailing
to the northern Baltic and Hanseatic regions, ships now also sailed in east-
bound directions to the Indies (and later in westbound directions to the
Americas aswell as to Africa).2 The first of these companieswas the Company
of Far (theCompagnie van Verre, an abbreviation ofCompagnie van Verre Reizen:
Company of Far Travels), established in the city of Amsterdam in 1594). As
successive companies in other cities followed, competition between these
companies grew. This prompted theNetherlands government to bring at least
most of these companies under the aegis of one overarching organization,
called the East India Company (the Oost-Indische Compagnie, usually referred
to as the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: the United East India Company)
1 P.J. Dortmond (main author),Handboek voor de naamloze en de besloten vennootschap, Deventer:
Kluwer 2013, no 231, J. Winter & J.B. Wezeman, Van de BV en de NV, Deventer: Kluwer
2013, pp. 27-29. Cfr. M. Olaerts, ‘De aandeelhouder en het vennootschappelijk verband:
de kwalificatie van de vennootschap en de invloed op de vennootschappelijke belangen-
afweging’, Tijdschrift voor Ondernemingsbestuur 2015-2, pp. 51-64.
2 J. de Vries & A. van der Woude, Nederland 1500-1815. De eerste ronde van economische groei,
Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans 1995, pp. 411-417, 450-462 and 462-469.
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in 1602.3 The modern public limited company (with legislation dating back
to 1838) and by extension themodern private limited company (with legislation
dating back to 1971) are mostly regarded as descendants of the United East
India Company. However, there are conflicting views about the way in which
the public limited company (and the private limited company) build on the
earlier United East India Company.4
As a starting point on the heritage of the public limited company, all views
recognize that the United East India Company was a company whose shares
were traded on a stock exchange (this being the Amsterdam stock exchange).
The first (majority) opinion holds that the previously existing companies were
in effect limited partnerships in which the most important partners, who also
formed the board of directors of these companies, were as general partners
jointly and severally liable for the debts of these companies, and in which the
other less important partners as limited partners were not liable for the debts
of these companies.5 Building on this analysis, this opinion suggests that the
succeeding United East India Company was a company in which none of the
partners (including the most important partners who formed the board of
directors of the United East India Company) were liable any longer for the
debts of the United East India Company. The second (minority) opinion argues
that both the previously existing companies as well as the succeeding United
East India Company were business partnerships in which all partners were
liable for the debts of the company, although not jointly and severally, but
only proportionally.6 In addition, this opinion argues that any partner in both
the previously existing companies and the United East India Company could
escape from this proportional liability by giving up his shares in the company.
This would be the effect of the so-called droit d’abandon (the right to renounce)
that allowed shareholders to give up their shares (this right being the con-
sequence of the then common idea regarding the commercial law of the sea
that ‘no one can lose more to the sea than he has entrusted to it’). A strong
point of the first (majority) opinion is that it regards the United East India
Company and thereby the later public limited company as a logical follow-up
to the concept of the limited partnership, by simply extending non-liability
3 H.M. Punt, Het vennootschapsrecht van Holland. Het vennootschapsrecht van Holland, Zeeland
en West-Friesland in de rechtspraak van de Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland,
Deventer: Kluwer 2010, pp. 100-101.
4 P.J. Dortmond (main author),Handboek voor de naamloze en de besloten vennootschap, Deventer:
Kluwer 2013, nos. 1-39.
5 Discussed by: H.M. Punt, Het vennootschapsrecht van Holland. Het vennootschapsrecht van
Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland in de rechtspraak van de Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland
en West-Friesland, Deventer: Kluwer 2010, pp. 95-107. Cfr. On the United East India Com-
pany: L.O. Petram, The world’s first stock exchange. How the Amsterdam market for Dutch East
India Company shares became a modern securities market, 1602-1700 (2011: published at http://
dare.uva.nl).
6 Advanced by:W.M.F.Mansvelt,Rechtsvorm en geldelijk beheer bij de Oost-Indische Compagnie,
Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger 1922.
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for the debts of the partnership to all members of the company. However, a
weakness of this opinion is that it introduces non-liability of any and all
members for the debts of the United East India Company into an era where
the concept of legal personality had not been thought through. The second
(minority) opinion has a strong point in that it logically connects the droit
d’abandon in the United East India Company and its predecessors to the notion
that none of the members of a public limited company needs to be liable for
the debts of the company. A weak point of this opinion is that the idea that
both themost important partners and the less important partners of theUnited
East India Company were liable (albeit proportionally) for the debts of the
company is difficult to reconcile with the United East India Company having
shares that were traded on a stock exchange, making it difficult to retrieve
the identity of the partners that were liable for the debts of the company as
long as they did not invoke the droit d’abandon.
The legislation of 1838 clearly struggled with the proper way to regulate
the public limited company. It decided to regulate the business partnership,
the limited partnership and the public limited company on a par in the Com-
mercial Code (next regulating the professional partnership in the DCC). The
opening provision of the Title called ‘On the partnership of trade’ read:7 ‘The
law recognizes three partnerships of trade: the commercial partnership, the
limited partnership or partnership en commandite, [and] the public limited
company’.8 Interestingly, the public limited company was named (as it still
is today) naamloze vennootschap (meaning anonymous company), derived from
the French term société anonyme. In this respect (and also as an explanation
of the phrase naamloze vennootschap), the opening article on the public limited
company read: ‘The public limited company shall not have a common name,
nor shall it carry the name of one or several of its partners, but shall only be
indicated by the object of its business enterprise’.9 This somewhat strange
provisionmeant that the 1838 legislation tried to distinguish the public limited
company (a novelty in terms of legislation at the time) from the commercial
partnership and the limited partnership: unlike the commercial partnership
and the limited partnership the public limited company could not carry a
‘fantasy’ company name or have the names of its partners as part of its com-
pany name (note the use of the phrase partners instead of shareholders), but
could only be named e.g.Coal Trading Company or Grain Importing Company.
This is all the more understandable as the legislation of 1838 did not require
that the name of a public limited company should include thewordsNaamloze
7 ‘Van vennootschap van Koophandel’.
8 ‘DeWet erkent drie soorten van Vennootschappen van Koophandel: De vennootschap onder
eene firma; De vennootschap bij wijze van geldschieting, anders compagnieschap en
commandite genaamd; De naamlooze vennootschap’.
9 ‘De naamlooze vennootschap heeft geen firma, noch draagt den naam van een of meer
der vennooten, maar zij ontleent hare benaming alleen, van het voorwerp harer handels-
onderneming’.
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Vennootschap or the abbreviated form N.V. The 1838 legislation further stated
that ‘The partners or holders of the parts or shares shall not be liable beyond
the full amount of those parts or shares’,10 and ‘The company shall be led
by directors, appointed by the partners, who may or may not be partners
themselves, andmay or may not receive a salary, with or without supervision
by supervisory directors’.11 The 1838 legislation also stated that ‘Themanaging
directors shall be responsible only for proper execution of the tasks they are
commissioned with; as regards third parties they shall not be liable for the
debts of the company’.12 Under the present regulation of the public limited
company and the private limited company in the DCC the fact that directors
of a company are not responsible for the debts of the company in respect of
third parties is something that is regarded as being so logical and obvious
that there is not even a provision anymore that states this in so many words.
Interestingly, nowhere did the legislation of 1838 refer to the public limited
company as a ‘legal person’.
In 1928 a major overhaul took place of the legislation on the public limited
company in the Commercial Code.13 Under the new legislation the public
limited company was referred to as a ‘legal person’ and was required to have
the indication Naamloze Vennootschap or the abbreviated form N.V. as part of
its company name.14 Also, the ban on the use of a ‘fantasy’ company name
or the use of the names of its shareholders as part of the company name was
repealed.
4 HISTORIC CASE LAW (IN THE NETHERLANDS) OBSERVED
4.1 Introduction
This paragraph discusses two older judgments of the Dutch Supreme Court
that were rendered when Netherlands corporate law was still nascent. These
judgments give insight into the way in which the Dutch Supreme Court
already at that time underlined the strong position that corporate boards have
vis-à-vis both individual shareholders and the general meeting. These judg-
10 ‘De vennooten of houders dier actien of aandeelen zijn niet verder aansprakelijk, dan voor
het volle beloop derzelve’.
11 ‘De vennootschapwordt beheerd door daartoe, door de vennooten, aangestelde bestuurders,
deelgenooten of andere, al dan niet loontrekkende, met of zonder toezigt van commissaris-
sen’.
12 ‘De bestuurders zijn niet verder verantwoordelijk, dan ter zake van de behoorlijke uitvoering
van den aan hen opgedragen last; zij zijn uit kracht der verbindtenissen van de vennoot-
schap, aan derden niet persoonlijk verbonden’.
13 Stb. 1928/216.
14 ‘De naamlooze vennootschap is rechtspersoon […]’ and ‘De naam vangt aan of eindigt
met de woorden Naamlooze Vennootschap, hetzij voluit geschreven, hetzij afgekort tot
“N.V.”’.
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ments form the basis of the later judgment in the ASMI case discussed in
paragraph 5.
4.2 The Doetinchemse IJzergieterij case (1949)
In the Doetinchemse IJzergieterij case NV Uitgevers Maatschappij C. Misset
(Misset) had been the majority shareholder of NV Doetinchemse IJzergieterij
(Doetinchemse IJzergieterij) since 1933.15 Under the articles of Doetinchemse
IJzergieterij the supervisory board had the power to issue new shares of the
company. Twomanaging directors of Misset had been members of the super-
visory board of Doetinchemse IJzergieterij but had died in 1945 and 1947
respectively, leaving Misset no longer represented in the supervisory board
of Doetinchemse IJzergieterij. During the general meeting of Doetinchemse
IJzergieterij that was held in August 1947Misset became aware of the fact that
the supervisory board had issued a large number of shares. As a consequence,
Misset had lost its position as majority shareholder (it should be noted that
Netherlands company law at that time did not give existing shareholders a
right of first refusal when a public limited company issued new shares).Misset
brought a lawsuit against Doetinchemse IJzergieterij asking the District Court
to order provisional measures that would prohibit the new shareholders from
exercising their rights on the shares they had acquired. The District Court did
not award this request, but the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of Misset.
Doetinchemse IJzergieterij appealed to the Dutch Supreme Court. On its
part, the Dutch Supreme Court annulled the Court of Appeal’s decision and
affirmed the decision of the District Court that had ruled in favour of Doetin-
chemse IJzergieterij. The main argument in the proceedings before the Dutch
Supreme Court forwarded by Misset was phrased in quite plain terms. In the
opinion of Misset ‘supervisory directors could not take a decision that contra-
venes the interests and wishes of the majority shareholder’. The Dutch Supreme
Court rejected Misset’s argument in a very short consideration:
‘Supervisory directors who exercise their powers as a corporate organ shall be
guided by the interest of the company and shall give precedence to the interest
of the company in case this clashes with the interests of whatever shareholder’.
4.3 The Forum-Bank case (1955)
In the Forum-Bank case two shareholders of NV Forum-Bank (Forum-Bank) had
proposed that Forum-Bank buy back shares these shareholders held in the
company and that the price to be paid by Forum-Bank be used mainly to
15 Dutch Supreme Court 1 April 1949, NJ 1949/465 (Doetinchemse IJzergieterij).
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reduce the amount of debt these shareholders owed to the company.16 When
this proposal was discussed by the general meeting both the management
board and the supervisory board of Forum-Bank as well as five of the eight
shareholders who attended the general meeting opposed the proposal. The
management board and the supervisory board argued that accepting the
proposal would not be in the interest of Forum-Bank itself and its shareholders,
as it would undermine the liquidity of the bank, and that in accordance with
the articles this was a matter not to be decided by the general meeting but
by the management board. When it came to a vote, the voting power of the
two shareholders who hadmade the proposal (296 and 110 shares), combined
with the votes of the one shareholder who supported the proposal (5 shares),
was enough to have the proposal accepted by amajority of 411 votes in favour
of the proposal to 117 votes against the proposal. This prompted two opposing
shareholders to bring the matter before the District Court, asking the District
Court to declare that the decision by the general meeting was null and void
as it was outside the realm of the generalmeeting’s powers. TheDistrict Court
ruled in favour of these claimants and the Court of Appeal, on the basis of
the articles of Forum-Bank, confirmed this judgment.
One of the two shareholderswho had originally proposed that Forum-Bank
buy back the shares lodged an appeal to the Dutch Supreme Court. In this
appeal, themain argument was phrased in equally plain terms as the argument
in the Doetinchemse IJzergieterij case: even if it were to be accepted that the
competence to decide on buying back Forum-Bank’s shares fell within the
powers of the management board, the decision made by the general meeting
could not be null and void because:
‘the general meeting of shareholders […] has competence to order the management
board to act in certain ways, to wit to decide to buy back shares as is debated in
this case, for which reason that decision, in any case and as such and to that extent,
was made in a competent way and is not null and void.’
The Dutch Supreme Court, however, did not accept this line of reasoning and
dismissed the appeal. The Dutch Supreme Court first interpreted the appeal
as arguing in essence that:
‘it brings to the fore that the general meeting, in spite of the fact that buying back
the company’s shares […] falls within the competence of the management board,
has the power to instruct themanagement board to buy back shares of the company
for a specified price from certain sellers because the managing directors are sub-
ordinate to the public limited company and the general meeting exercises the
ultimate power in the public limited company.’
16 Dutch Supreme Court 21 January 1955, NJ 1959/43 (Forum-Bank).
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Then the Dutch Supreme Court rebutted the appeal in – again – a very short
consideration:
‘this argument, thus read, ignores that the general meeting too shall not transgress
the powers given to it by statutory law or by the articles.’
4.4 A short comment
Interestingly, in one consideration in the Doetinchemse IJzergieterij case
(‘[Incorrectly, the] Court of Appeal took as a starting point that the nature
of the corporate contract entails as a fundamental right that shareholders have
a right of first refusal when shares are issued’) the Dutch Supreme Court
rendered a reference that the Court of Appeal had made to ‘the nature of the
corporate contract’. Apparently, the Court of Appeal at the time still regarded
the corporate form as a contractual relationship between its participants. On
its part, the Dutch Supreme Court underlined the autonomous position of the
‘[s]upervisory directors who exercise their powers as a corporate organ’.
Likewise, in the Forum-Bank case the Dutch Supreme Court underlined the
autonomous position of the management board. Both cases indicate a line of
thinking whereby the corporate form gradually developed into an abstract
organizational form inwhich the role of the corporate directors is pre-eminent.
5 A MORE RECENT CASE (IN THE NETHERLANDS) OBSERVED
5.1 Introduction
In the ASMI case the Dutch Supreme Court had the opportunity to lay down
what a modern twenty-first century company is: an abstract organizational
form wherein the duty of the directors to be guided by the best interests of
the company and the undertaking that is connected with it implies that both
shareholders and the general meeting can exert very little leverage when it
comes to influencing the company’s policies or asking directors to act in certain
ways. In a two-tier board this applies to both (the members of) the manage-
ment board and (the members of) the supervisory board.
5.2 The ASMI case (2010)
ASM International NV (ASMI) was a listed public limited company that had been
established by A.H. del Prado in 1968. ASMI held 53% of the shares in ASM
Pacific Technology Ltd (ASMPT) that was also a listed company (in Hong Kong).
A.H. del Prado held approximately 21% of the shares of ASMI. He had been
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the chief executive officer (CEO) of ASMI from its establishment in 1968 and
remained so until 1 March 2008. On that day his son, C.D. del Prado, who
had been on the management board of ASMI since 2006, became the new CEO
of ASMI. Since 2005 a number of shareholders of ASMI had been raising concerns
about the way ASMI was run. These shareholders were Fursa Master Global
Event Driven Fund LP (Fursa), an investment fund that held approximately
6% of the shares of ASMI, and a number of investment funds that operated
under the name ofHermes and together held approximately 15% of the shares
of ASMI. Their concerns concentrated on two issues. They argued that the way
in which the articles of ASMI provided for the appointment of the members
of both the management board and the supervisory board of ASMI was not
in conformity with what shareholders of a listed company would expect. In
their opinion especially the fact that since 2006 both A.H. del Prado and C.D.
del Prado had been on the management board of ASMI resulted in ‘family ties’
that raised ‘doubts and concerns that there will not be enough distance be-
tween the members of the management board’. They also commented on the
fact that the shares in ASMPT traded against approximately EUR 18 per share
whereas the shares in ASMI traded against approximately EUR 12 per share
only. In their opinion this could only mean (since ASMPT as a 53%-subsidiary
company of ASMI was being favoured more by investors than ASMI) that the
financial results of ASMI were negatively influenced by its own business that
was not profitable enough. The differences of opinion between ASMI’smanage-
ment board and supervisory board on the one hand and Fursa and Hermes
on the other hand resulted in extended talks between these parties and finally
a lawsuit against ASMI under the provisions on Right of Inquiry in Title 8 of
the Second Book of the Dutch Civil Code. In these proceedings the Enterprise
Court of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in 2009 came to the conclusion that
there were well-founded reasons to doubt ASMI’s policies.17 On appeal, how-
ever, this judgment was set aside by the Dutch Supreme Court.18 One reason
for this was that the judgment of the Enterprise Court was, as the Dutch
Supreme Court considered, flawed because ‘it follows to a sufficient degree
from the facts of the case that themanagement board did start a dialoguewith
the external shareholders, went into their arguments and dismissed these
arguments on the basis of well-founded and defendable counter-arguments,
taking into account the long-term interests of all those involved in the com-
pany.’ What follows below are two considerations of the Dutch Supreme Court
on general issues of company law:
17 Enterprise Court 5 August 2009, JOR 2009/254 (ASMI).
18 Dutch Supreme Court 9 July 2010, JOR 2010/228 (ASMI). M.M.Mendel &W.J. Oostwouder,
‘Het vennootschappelijk belang na recente uitspraken van de Hoge Raad’, Nederlands
Juristenblad 2013, no. 1776.
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‘The management board of a company, when fulfilling its obligations under
statutory law or the articles, shall give precedence to the best interests of the
company and the undertaking connected with it and shall in its decision-making
take into account the interests of all stakeholders, among whom the shareholders
are to be reckoned. Therefore, ASMI’s strategy is in principle a matter for the man-
agement board to decide on, and it shall be the management board, under the
supervision of the supervisory board, which is to judge whether and to what extent
it is desirable to discuss this with the ‘external’ shareholders. Although themanage-
ment board is under an obligation to give account to the general meeting of share-
holders it is, in the absence of arrangements under statutory law or the articles,
not obliged to involve the general meeting of shareholders in advance in matters
that fall within its competence.’
And:
‘The supervisory board shall supervise the management board’s policy as well as
the general course of affairs in the company and the undertaking connected with
it and shall advise the management board […]. This function under statutory law
does not entail an obligation for the supervisory board to intermediate in conflicts
between the management board and shareholders. Neither is the supervisory board
under an obligation to give account to the shareholders on this matter. […] The
supervisory board, when approached by shareholders requesting it to intermediate
or to take other action, will have to act adequately on the basis of its own function.
However, an obligation to intermediate actively would […] contravene themargin
of discretion that the supervisory board has in fulfilling its function.’
5.3 A short comment
The ASMI case represents the apex in the Netherlands of the line of thought
that regards the corporate form as an abstract organizational form in which
the authority of the corporate directors is pre-eminent. The Dutch Supreme
Court decided that amanagement board is in principle ‘not obliged to involve
the general meeting of shareholders in advance in matters that fall within its
competence’ and that a supervisory board is not obliged to ‘intermediate in
conflicts between the management board and shareholders’. Being the apex
of that line of thought, the Dutch Supreme Court’s judgment is also question-
able. The judgment puts extreme emphasis on the autonomous position of
both themanagement board and the supervisory board of a company vis-à-vis
the company’s shareholders. In doing so, the judgment shows little regard
for the interests of the shareholders as investors in the company. After all,
should a management board not be obliged to at least consult the company’s
general meeting on major issues that are important to the shareholders? And
likewise, what is the use of having a supervisory board that refrains from
intermediating in conflicts between themanagement board and the company’s
investors?
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6 THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN
THE SELECTICA CASE (2010)
6.1 Introduction
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware in the Selectica
case shows that the general features of the corporate form are much alike
across jurisdictions: as in the Netherlands the Delaware Supreme Court allows
corporate boards a wide margin of appreciation that shareholders are unable
to encroach upon.
6.2 The Selectica case
Selectica, Inc. (Selectica) was a listed corporation that provided enterprise
software solutions. Selectica had become a listed corporation in 2000 and had
since incurred substantial losses. The price of Selectica shares had fallen from
$ 30 per share at the time of the initial public offering to less than $ 1 per
share. The value of Selectica consisted mainly of cash reserves, intellectual
property rights, goodwill and ‘accumulated NOLs’. NOLs are ‘net operating
loss carryforwards’ that under (U.S. federal) tax law a corporation that does
not achieve a positive net income may use as a fiscal means ‘to provide a
refund of prior taxes paid or to reduce the amount of future income tax owed’.
Therefore, NOLs are a valuable asset. Selectica’s NOLs amounted to approx-
imately $ 160 million. A corporation may only make use of NOLs that it has
generated itself and under (U.S. federal) tax law the use of NOLs is limited
following an ‘ownership change’. For the purposes of applying this limitation,
an ownership change generally occurs when over a period of time of three
years 50% of a corporation’s shares change ownership; however, in this calcula-
tion only shareholders who hold 5% or more of a corporations’s shares are counted.
Selectica had employed a ‘shareholder rights plan’ (a poison pill) as a
protective measure against a possible hostile takeover since 2003. This share-
holder rights plan would become active if a Selectica shareholder would
acquire 15% (or more) of Selectica’s shares. In 2008 the board of directors of
Selectica amended this shareholder rights plan as a means of protecting the value
of its NOLs to the effect that the plan would be triggered when a shareholder
would acquire 4.99% (or more) of Selectica’s shares.
In December 2008 Trilogy, Inc. (Trilogy), together with its subsidiary
company Versata Enterprises, Inc. (Versata) intentionally surpassed the 5%
threshold (‘bought in excess of’ the threshold) by then acquiring 6.7% in total
of Selectica’s (common) shares. Its reasons for doing so were to ‘bring some
clarity and urgency’ to their relationship that had been troubled (also by
lawsuits) for a number of years. Under these circumstances the board of
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directors of Selectica in January 2009 decided to put the shareholder rights
plan into action. This meant that the shareholder rights plan ‘doubled the
number of shares of Selectica common stock owned by each shareholder of
record, other than Trilogy orVersata, thereby reducing their beneficial holdings
from 6.7% to 3.3%’. Preceding this, in December 2008, Selectica had filed suit
in the Delaware Court of Chancery ‘seeking a declaration that the NOL Poison
Pill was valid and enforceable’. On their part, Trilogy and Versata argued that
the (use of the) shareholder rights plan was unlawful. The Court of Chancery
ruled in favour of Selectica.19 Trilogy and Versata appealed to the Supreme
Court of the State of Delaware, but in its judgment of 4 October 2010 the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Chancery.20 The
Supreme Court considered: ‘The Court of Chancery concluded that the pro-
tection of company NOLs may be an appropriate corporate policy that merits
a defensive response when they are threatened. We agree’, because:
‘The Court of Chancery found the record “replete with evidence” that, based upon
the expert advice it received, the Boardwas reasonable in concluding that Selectica’s
NOLs were worth preserving and that Trilogy’s actions presented a serious threat
of their impairment. […] Those findings are not clearly erroneous. They are sup-
ported by the record and the result of a logical deductive reasoning process’,
and because the shareholder rights plan (that was also a protective measure)
was not such that it had the effect of precluding a possible takeover of
Selectica:
‘The Court of Chancery concluded that the NOL Poison Pill and Reloaded NOL
Poison Pill were not preclusive.[21] […] The record supports the Court of Chan-
cery’s factual determination and legal conclusion that Selectica’s NOL Poison Pill
and Reloaded NOL Poison Pill do not meet that preclusivity standard.’
Furthermore, ‘The implementation of the Reloaded NOL Poison Pill was also
a reasonable response’:
‘The record indicates that the Board was presented with expert advice that sup-
ported its ultimate findings that the NOLs were a corporate asset worth protecting,
that the NOLs were at risk as a result of Trilogy’s actions, and that the steps that
the Board ultimately took were reasonable in relation to that threat.’
19 Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware 26 February 2010, CA #4241-VCN (Selectica),
at: http://courts.delaware.gov.
20 Supreme Court of the State of Delaware 4 October 2010, no. 193, 2010 (Selectica), footnotes
deleted, at: http://courts.delaware.gov.
21 The Reloaded Poisin Pill refers to the amendment of the shareholder rights plan to the
effect that the it would be triggered when a shareholders would acquire 4.99% (or more)
of Selectica’s shares.
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6.3 A short comment
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware in Selectica, like
the judgments of the Dutch Supreme Court in the Doetinchemse IJzergieterij,
Forum-Bank and ASMI cases, allows corporate boards awidemargin of discre-
tion in conducting the affairs of the corporation. That corporate boards have
this wide margin of discretion is inherent in the corporate form where share-
holders as investors entrust resources to the corporation.22 In that sense, the
judgments of the Dutch Supreme Court and the Selectica judgment of the
SupremeCourt of the State of Delaware point in the same direction. However,
the idea that corporate boards have this wide margin of discretion does not
in itself give much guidance to a corporate board as to whose interests it
should take into account in conducting the affairs of the corporation. On that
issue, the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court in Cancun may be of help.
This judgment is discussed in the following paragraph.
7 THE CANCUN CASE IN THE NETHERLANDS: IS THE PENDULUM SWINGING
IN A NEW DIRECTION?
7.1 The Cancun case (2014)
CancunHolding II BV (Cancun Holding II) had been established in August 2005
by Cancun Holding I BV (Cancun Holding I, an (investment) company of the
Lliteras family) for the purpose of realizing a hotel complex in the Mexican
city of Cancun through its (almost wholly-owned) subsidiary company Efesyde
SA de CV (Efesyde). In October 2006 Cancun Holding II became a joint venture
company between CancunHolding I and InversionesMa yMo SL (Inversiones,
an (investment) company of the Nicolau family). On 18 June 2009 Invernostra
SL (Unipersonal) (Invernostra) acquired 7% of the shares of CancunHolding II;
CancunHolding I and Inversiones each retained 46.5% of the shares of Cancun
Holding II.
22 R. Kraakman, ‘The Durability of the Corporate Form’, in: P. DiMaggio (ed.), The Twenty-First-
Century Firm. Changing Economic Organization in International Perspective, Princeton/Oxford:
Princeton University Press 2001, pp. 147-160 (150).
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The costs of realizing the hotel complex amounted to USD 140 million; the
hotel complex (‘Secret Silver Sands’) started operating inAugust 2008. During
the summer and fall of 2008 differences of opinion began to emerge between
Cancun Holding I (the Lliteras family) and Inversiones (the Nicolau family)
about the costs involved with building and operating the hotel complex.
The shares that Cancun Holding I held in Cancun Holding II were ‘A
shares’, the shares that Inversiones held in Cancun Holding II were ‘B shares’,
and the shares that Invernostra held in Cancun Holding II were ‘C shares’.
Under the articles the A, B and C shares carried with them the right to
nominatemanaging directors of CancunHolding II. The C shares carriedwith
them additional rights that implied that some decisions of the management
board could only be made in a meeting of the management board where at
least two board members were present, among whom at least one board
member who was nominated by the holder of the C shares, and that these
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decisions had to be approved also by at least one board member who was
nominated by the holder of the C shares. Since 18 June 2009 the management
board of Cancun Holding II had consisted of K.H.K.L.B. Roovers (managing
director A, on behalf of Cancun Holding I), Equity Trust Co. NV (managing
director B, on behalf of Inversiones) and J.M. Navarro Lacoba (managing
director C, on behalf of Invernostra).
Inversiones had a claim against Efesyde (that was at the time not completely
immediately due) for work it had performed on the hotel complex. When
Efesyde asked its bank to enhance its credit, the bank indicated that it would
only bewilling to do so if Efesydewas somehow able to bring its debt position
vis-à-vis Inversiones to an end. In order to accomplish this, Efesyde issued a
large number of shares to Inversiones on 1 July 2009 that Inversiones paid up
by balancing its claim against Efesyde. As a consequence of this, Inversiones
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became a 78%-shareholder in Efesyde and the participation of Cancun Hold-
ing II in Efesyde decreased from almost 100% to 22% (‘the first watering down’
of the participation of Cancun Holding II in Efesyde). This arrangement was
intended to be temporary only.
The management board of Efesyde had for a time consisted of three persons
from the Lliteras family. Of these three persons, following the issue of shares
to Inversiones, only Margarita Lliteras remained on the board, and G. Nicolau
Salleras (on behalf of Inversiones) and J.M. Navarro Lacoba (on behalf of
Invernostra) became board members.
At some point during the summer of 2009 the management board of
Cancun Holding II put forward the proposal that Cancun Holding II issue
shares to Inversiones and Invernostra (but not to Cancun Holding I). This
proposal would result in the participation of Cancun Holding I decreasing
to 0.08%, Invernostra retaining its participation of 7% and Inversiones increasing
its participation to 92.92%. The background of this proposal was to compensate
Inversiones for giving up its claim against Efesyde. Obviously, CancunHolding
I was against the proposal and did not attend the general meeting that would
decide on the issue of the shares. As a result, the shares could not be issued
because under the articles of Cancun Holding II a decision to issue shares
required the presence of all shareholders and a unanimous vote. However,
the articles also provided that in such a case a second general meeting could
be convened where a decision to issue shares could be made regardless of
the number of shareholders present and by a simplemajority. Themanagement
board of CancunHolding II convened such ameeting. This meetingwas never
held because on 21 September 2009 Cancun Holding I filed a lawsuit against
Cancun Holding II under the provisions on the Right of Inquiry in Title 8 of
the Second Book of the Dutch Civil Code. But then …
…on 1October 2009 Invernostra made over its participation in CancunHold-
ing II to Inversiones. Inversiones now held 53.5% of the shares in Cancun Hold-
ing II.
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Also, on 3 November 2009 the general meeting of Efesyde decided to issue
shares to Inversiones. The notice convening this general meeting had been
published in a local Mexican newspaper. Cancun Holding I was not repres-
ented in this general meeting because it was not aware that it had been con-
vened (the fact that the general meeting would be held had been discussed
during a meeting of the board of Efesyde but Margarita Lliteras had not
attended that boardmeeting). As a consequence, the participation of Inversiones
in Efesyde increased from 78% to 99.87% and the participation of Cancun
Holding II BV in Efesyde decreased from 22% to 0.13% (‘the second watering
down’ of the participation of Cancun Holding II in Efesyde).
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In the proceedings instituted by Cancun Holding I against Cancun Holding
II the Enterprise Court in its judgment of 28 April 2010 came to the conclusion
that there were well-founded reasons to doubt Cancun Holding II’s policies
and awarded the request of Cancun Holding I that an independent investiga-
tion be conducted into the policies and the course of affairs of CancunHolding
II.23 On the basis of the outcome of this investigation, the Enterprise Court
on 19 July 2012 concluded at the request of Cancun Holding I that there had
been mismanagement on the part of Cancun Holding II.24 The Enterprise
Court in particular held it against the management board of Cancun Holding
II that it had not done enough to protect the position of Cancun Holding I
during ‘the first watering down’ of the participation of Cancun Holding II
23 Enterprise Court 28 April 2010, ARO 2010/71 (Cancun).
24 Enterprise Court 19 July 2012, JOR 2013/7 and ARO 2012/113 (Cancun).
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in Efesyde, the transfer by Invernostra of its participation in Cancun Holding
II to Inversiones and ‘the secondwatering down’ of the participation of Cancun
Holding II in Efesyde.
Several parties involved lodged an appeal to the Dutch Supreme Court
against this judgment of the Enterprise Court. On 4 April 2014 the Dutch
Supreme Court rebutted these appeals in four judgments.25 Some of the
arguments put forward before the Dutch Supreme Court raised the question
whether the Enterprise Court could have based its judgment that there was
mismanagement on the part of Cancun Holding II on the conduct of the
company’smanagement board. In two considerations the Dutch SupremeCourt
went into the duties of the management board of a company both in general
and with a focus on a joint venture company. The first consideration reads:
‘In fulfilling their duties the managing directors are to be guided by the best
interests of the company and the undertaking connected with it […]. What these
interests are, depends on the circumstances of the case. If there is an undertaking
connected with the company, the interests of the company are normally defined
by the advancement of the continued success of this undertaking. In the case of
a joint venture company the interests of the company are furthermore defined by
the nature and the contents of the cooperation as agreed upon by the shareholders.
The nature and the contents of the collaboration in a joint venture company where
the shareholders are on an equal footing may imply that the interests of the com-
pany too are served best by the continuation of stable relationships between the
shareholders; this maymean that the relationships between the shareholders must
not be changed any further than is necessary in the light of the circumstances.’
The second consideration reads:
‘In fulfilling their duties the managing directors are furthermore […] bound to
exercise due care towards the interests of all those associated with the company
25 Dutch Supreme Court 4 April 2014, ARO 2014/71 (Cancun), Dutch Supreme Court 4 April
2014, ARO 2014/72 (Cancun), Dutch Supreme Court 4 April 2014, ARO 2014/73 (Cancun)
andDutch SupremeCourt 4 April 2014, JOR 2014/290 andARO 2014/74 (Cancun).M.J.G.C.
Raaijmakers, ‘Cancun: een joint venture klem tussen contract en instituut’, Ars Aequi 2014,
pp. 459-465.M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, ‘Bestuursautonomie in een (gezamenlijke) dochter-B.V.:
een novum in concernverhoudingen?’, Tijdschrift voor Ondernemingsbestuur 2015-1, pp. 2-12.
M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers, ‘De “institutionele opvatting”: grondslag en inhoud?’,Ondernemings-
recht 2015-5, pp. 155-164. On the implications of the Cancun judgment: Autonomie van het
bestuur en haar grenzen voor en na de Cancun-uitspraak, Deventer: Kluwer 2015: M.J.G.C.
Raaijmakers, ‘Over de oorsprong, zin en betekenis van de “institutionele” opvatting’, pp.
10-29, A.F.M.Dorresteijn, ‘”Cancun”, bestuursautonomie en vennootschapsbelang, pp. 30-38,
J.B. Huizink, ‘Bestuursautonomie na Cancun’, pp. 39-48, W.J.M. van Veen, ‘Vennootschaps-
rechtelijke doorwerking, bestuursautonomie en bestuurstaak bij joint ventures na Cancun:
what’s new?’, pp. 49-66, A.F. Verdam, ‘Iets over de verhouding tussen de institutionele
opvatting, het vennootschapsbelang en de norm van redelijkheid en billijkheid, mede in
relatie tot bestuurders, commissarissen en aandeelhouders’, pp. 67-78. M.P.P. van Buuren,
‘Vennootschappelijk belang? Leg uit en pas toe’, Fiscaal Tijdschrift Vermogen 2014 pp. 13-18.
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and its undertaking. […] This duty of care may imply that managing directors in
serving the interest of the company shall ensure that the interests of all those
associated with the company or its undertaking are not being harmed unnecessarily
or disproportionately. As also follows from [the last part of] the foregoing con-
sideration, the duty of the managing directors of a joint venture company to exercise
due care towards the shareholders may involve a special duty of care towards the
position of a shareholder whose interest is watered down or threatens to be watered
down (further).’
7.2 A short comment
In the Cancun case the Dutch Supreme Court did not in so many words refer
to the corporate form as a contractual relationship between its participants.
However, the Dutch Supreme Court did refer to a joint venture company as
a company where ‘the interests of the company are […] defined by the nature
and the contents of the cooperation as agreed upon by the shareholders’, and
added to this that the management board of a joint venture company is under
an obligation to protect ‘the position of a shareholder whose interest is watered
down or threatens to be watered down’. This could be regarded as an implicit
recognition of the special organizational nature of a joint venture company
as a contractual relationship between its shareholders.
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE DUTY TO ADVANCE AND PRESERVE
For courts in adjudicating cases before them to refer to the chacteristics of a
company is not unusual and would only be expected. The Dutch Supreme
Court e.g. in a judgment of 6 December 2013 upheld a judgment of the Enter-
prise Court by considering that the Enterprise Court had not erred in consider-
ing that ‘more knowledge and insight (andmore efforts to acquire that know-
ledge and insight) may be expected on the part of a systemic bank (in view
of its duty of care […]) than from others under other circumstances’26 How-
ever, the Dutch Supreme Court had not before referred to the characteristics
of a company in connection with the duty of directors to be guided by the
best interests of the company and the undertaking connected with it. In
connection with this duty, the Dutch Supreme Court on several occasions
underlined the autonomous position of corporate directors vis-à-vis the com-
pany’s shareholders and the general meeting: corporate directors are free to
take decisions that contravene the interests of shareholders (Doetinchemse
IJzergieterij); in the absence of provisions in the articles corporate directors are
not obliged to follow instructions given to them by the general meeting (Forum-
26 Dutch Supreme Court 6 December 2013, JOR 2014/65 (Fortis).
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Bank); in the absence of statutory provisions or provisions in the articles a
management board is not under an obligation to consult the general meeting
about strategic issues; and a supervisory board is not under an obligation to
intermediate in conflicts between the management board and shareholders
(ASMI). This reasoning principally left it to corporate boards and directors
themselves to determine what is in the best interests of the company and the
undertaking connected with it. While allowing boards and directors a wide
margin of discretion, this reasoning also provided little guidance. It would
seem that for the first time such guidance is now available. It follows from
Cancun that corporate boards and directors are obliged to advance the con-
tinued success of the undertaking that is connected with the company, taking
into account the organizational specifics of the company. In Cancun these
organizational specifics were that the company was a joint venture company
in which the shareholders were, and were supposed to remain, on an equal
footing. In other cases other organizational characteristics may be relevant:
e.g. that the company is the parent company of a group, that the company
is a subsidiary company in a group, that the company has only one shareholder
or that the company is a family business. That corporate boards shall be guided
by the best interests of the company and the undertaking connected with it
means, as the Cancun judgment indicates, that their prime duty is to advance
the success of the undertaking that is connected with the company (the fact
that there is an undertaking connected with the company is certainly an
important characteristic) as well as to preserve the company’s other organiza-
tional characteristics. Thus, this is The Duty to Advance and Preserve. Interesting-
ly, this is neatly in line with a consideration of the Supreme Court of the State
of Delaware in the Selectica case on protective measures against a possible
hostile takeover: ‘Delaware courts have approved the adoption of a Shareholder
Rights Plan as an anti-takeover device […]. Any NOL poison pill’s principal
intent, however, is to prevent the inadvertent forfeiture of potentially valuable assets,
not to protect against hostile takeover attempts’ (italics added). As a conclusion
it would seem safe to say that in the Netherlands the statutory core legal
concept of the company is now being decisively influenced by another statutory
core legal concept: the duty of corporate directors in the performance of their
duties to be guided by the best interests of the company and the undertaking
that is connected with it. Whereas the company remains an abstract organ-
izational form in which the authority of the board of directors is pre-eminent,
corporate boards are now being offered guidance in deciding how they should
fulfil this duty. Corporate directors may go on the assumption that they should
regard the undertaking that is connected with the company as well as the
company’s other organizational characteristics as strong indications of what
‘their’ company is about essentially.

